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Abstract 
Using a combined conceptual and single case-based research methodology, we explore 
the process connecting a buyers attempt to transfer its sustainability requirements with 
its suppliers’ willingness to participate. We conclude that buyer promoted sustainability 
practices in the supply chain can be understood as multiple decision problems. The case 
illustrate how accounting devices play major roles in resolving these decision problems, 
and how decision criteria apparently unconnected to the sustainability issue affect the 
outcome of the sustainability transferral process in the supply chain. 
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Introduction 
Sustainability in the supply chain is a topic growing in importance for practitioners as 
well as for research. Only a few contributions however have explored how buyers’ 
practices to transfer sustainability requirements to their suppliers are structured and how 
suppliers are incentivised to participate in such practices. 
When a firm adopts sustainable principles, it accepts that these principles hold it 
accountable for the social and environmental impact arising along its supply chain. A 
sustainability initiative cannot improve one firm’s efficiency and performance 
individually because the social and environmental performance of the supply chain can 
be achieved only through the interaction of various activities undertaken by each player. 
In principle, if one member of the chain fails to act according to the agreed upon 
sustainability initiative, the hole chain potentially will suffer with the potential 
implication of consumer sanctions, negative press, capital loss, government 
interventions and damaged brands (Petersen and Andersen, 2006). As a consequence the 
involvement and participation of suppliers in sustainability assurance initiatives in the 
supply chain is of fundamental importance. However since not all members of the 
supply chain can be assumed to be equally enthusiastic about added sustainability 
requirements, one of the major challenges faced by buyers when implementing 
sustainability in their supply chains is the potential unwillingness or reluctance of their 
suppliers to invest financially or mentally in such initiatives. As a result, suppliers are 
an inherent source of sustainability risk to the supply chain, and if not managed properly 
they can be a bottleneck in pursuing the goal of a more sustainable supply chain. 
Combining this with the inherent difficulties of enforce social and environmental 
requirements across a global supply chain due to the geographically-, economically-, 
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legally-, culturally- and politically- separation of the involved firms (Pedersen and 
Andersen, 2006, p. 228) highlights the importance of research exploring sustainability 
transferral processes and supplier incentives to participate in them. 
We define buyer promoted sustainability activities in the supply chain as a buyers 
intentions to, and actual observable practices that, integrate social and environmental 
issues into its supply chain management routines in order to improve the social and 
environmental performance of its supply chain. The objective for such practices is how 
the buyer can secure that its requirements on sustainability are transferred to its 
suppliers. The general idea is that by using a combination of different managerial 
devices or mechanism ordered in a certain sequence, the focal buying firm’s social and 
environmental norms and requirements will be known to and practices by the supplier 
and in turn by the suppliers of the supplier and ultimately by the wider supply chain.  
Almost no research has addressed incentives for supplier participation in 
sustainability initiatives managed by buying firms (Baden et al., 2009; Lee, 2008). The 
work of Lee (2008) and Baden et al. (2009) begins to fill this void, by explicitly 
examining drivers for the participation of small and medium-sized suppliers in green 
supply chain initiatives and the effect of buyer pressure on suppliers in SMEs to 
demonstrate CSR practices.  
We are interested in following the conscious or unconscious construction of the 
mechanisms that help motivate or de-motivate suppliers to act according to, or against 
buyer-promoted sustainability initiatives. Such an examination implies following the 
chain of activity starting in the focal buying firm, when this firm engage in the 
structuring of such practices and ending at the supplier as an influence attempt. We 
formulate the following research question: How can we understand the process 
connecting a buyers attempt to transfer its sustainability requirements with its suppliers’ 
willingness to participate?  
In the next paragraph we present our research methodology. In section three, we 
briefly discuss existing literature on sustainability practices in the supply chain. Then 
we present and analyse EAMs sustainability transferral framework and how EAM 
interacts with its suppliers to transfer its sustainability requirements. We will analyse 
the case and suggest a conceptual process model for the transferral of sustainability in 
the supply chain. Finally we conclude and provide suggestions for future research.  
 
Research methodology   
Using a combined conceptual and case based research methodology, we explore a 
buyer in the process of developing sustainability transferral mechanisms and 
implementing sustainability requirements in its supply chain. EAM (a fictional name to 
preserve firm anonymity) a mitt sized European firm with an annual turnover of around 
750 million Euros and more than 5000 employees worldwide, develops manufactures 
and sells electronic appliances and has recently developed a code of conduct and a set of 
procedures to identify risk and promote ethical behaviour at its suppliers. We observe 
how these activities and mechanisms are designed in order for them to be able to 
transfer sustainability requirements to all involved suppliers. We then explore the 
interaction between EAM and their suppliers, and how suppliers respond to the code of 
conduct and the procedures communicated to and enforced upon them. 
Our goal is not to develop new theory, but to describe accurately an instance of a 
process connecting a buyers attempt to transfer its sustainability requirements with its 
suppliers’ willingness to participate, provide ramifications and ultimately guidelines for 
managers. A case study approach matches well with the “how” research questions in 
this research (Yin, 2003) and our conceptual research methods based on descriptive, 
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empirical investigation can further significantly increase the external validity of our 
research conclusions and their corresponding relevance to managers (Meredith, 1993, p. 
2). The results from our case cannot be subject to statistical generalisation, but it can be 
used as a basis for generating theoretical constructs and propositions (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
In order to collect data on the buyers’ sustainability transferring process the 
researcher initially interviewed managers in the purchasing organization. Interviews 
were structures informally and as semi structured open-ended type interviews (Kvale, 
2007). It was important to be as open as possible and not restrict collected data. At the 
time, the researcher entered in the organization the buyers sustainability transferring 
process had not been finalised and internal workshops were running. To learn about 
internal actor’s views, expectations and fears on the new sustainability transferring 
process the researcher participated as observer in these workshops. Also, at this stage 
written data in the form of the code of conduct document, procedure descriptions, 
corrections to the code of conduct and procedures were collected. 
In order to collect data on the actual transferral processes, buyer-supplier interaction 
and supplier’s reactions we used several different sources of data. Our selection of 
suppliers was based on where transferral processes and interaction was taking place that 
could be observed. When possible the researcher participated in meetings between the 
buyer and its suppliers. In other cases buyers purchasing representatives acted as 
observers and collected data in the form of notes or tape recordings. The researcher 
interviewed EAM representatives in order to learn about their views on the specific 
supplier relationship and how suppliers reacted to the imposed social and environmental 
requirements. Written data was accessed by the researcher in the form of contracts, 
notes from meetings, e-mail exchanges, audit reports and corrective action project plans.    
Sustainability practices in the supply chain 
Research on sustainability, CSR or environmental/green supply chain management is 
diverse, covering areas such as: The definition of the concepts (Carter and Jennings, 
2002, 2004; Carter and Rogers, 2008; Krause et al., 2009), drivers of sustainability 
practices (Hall, 2000; Carter and Jennings, 2002, 2004; Preuss 2005; González-Benito 
et al., 2006), the sustainability practices themselves (Min and Galle, 2001; Pedersen and 
Andersen, 2006; Vasileiou and Morris, 2006; Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen, 2009; 
Pagell and Wu, 2009), and the consequences and performance implications of 
sustainability practices (Montabon et al., 2000; Carter, 2005; Rao and Holt, 2005; 
Markley and Davis, 2007; Cruz, 2009; Kaynak and Montiel, 2009). In this research we 
are narrowly interested in literature discussing buyer practices and buyer-supplier 
interaction on social and environmental requirements.  
In the literature, sustainability is defined as a broad term encompassing an economic, 
a social and an environmental dimension (Barbier, 1987; Gladwin et al., 1995, 
Elkington, 1998). As a consequence, in order for a supply chain to be categorised as 
sustainable, it must be financial able to continue what it is currently doing for extended 
periods of time without violating current and future environmental and social balances. 
Some contributions discuss the managerial devices used by buyers in order to set, 
communicate, implement, and evaluate progress in attaining social and environmental 
performance objectives, both internally in the focal buying organization and externally 
with suppliers (Mamic, 2005; Cilberti et al., 2008; Lee 2008). Mamic (2005, p.83) 
explores an integrated management approach resting on four main activities. First the 
active involvement of top management representatives in the development of a vision 
on supply chain sustainability. Second securing that employees and supplier 
understands the vision whilst recognizing, identifying and adjusting communication 
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approaches to the multiplicity of audiences to whom the sustainability requirements 
may be addressed. Third implementing the practices internally and at suppliers. Fourth a 
monitoring, feedback and improvement phase including an audit procedure and a 
corrective action-planning activity (Mamic, 2005). Cilberti et al. (2008, p. 1580) 
proposes three management devices as particular useful for the transfer of sustainability 
requirement. First, establishing written supplier requirements in the form of a code of 
conduct. Second, a supplier social and environmental performance monitoring element 
designed to verify compliance to the code. A training and communication element is the 
third set of managerial devices suggested. Such tools must be practices in order to help 
raise suppliers’ awareness of the social and environmental requirements (Cilberti et al. 
2008). Lee (2008) distinguishes between a monitoring-based approach involving 
gathering and processing supplier information, setting supplier assessment criteria, and 
evaluating the social and environmental performance of incoming goods and the 
suppliers that provide them, and a collaboration-based approach involves training and 
education programs given to suppliers, social and environmental managerial 
information sharing, and collaborative research with suppliers. 
Pedersen and Andersen (2006) explore how a company can secure or safeguard that 
their suppliers fulfill their obligations stated in the signed code of conduct. Five clusters 
of safeguarding mechanisms are identified: Using direct sanctions, involving suppliers, 
securing goal congruence, third-party interventions, trust and reputational effects. In a 
different publications, however also building on the IKEA companies IWAY practices 
as its case, Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen (2009) claim to identify knowledge enhancing 
mechanisms, knowledge controlling mechanism, firm-specific assets and corporate 
history as four contingency factors influencing CSR implementation in supply chains. 
As part of the knowledge enhancing mechanisms which according to the authors will 
help embed CSR in the organization and supply chain the authors propose to include 
“formal and informal training of key personnel at the supplier level, positive incentives 
for suppliers in terms of long-term contracts and enlarged volume if they implement 
codes of conduct, and regular auditing of suppliers’ performance”(p. 82).  
Only very few contributions, within research discussing sustainability practices in the 
supply chain, have addressed such issues from the perspective of suppliers. How, will 
suppliers react to focal buyers attempts to enforce codes of conducts on them? What 
facilitates small and medium-sized suppliers in participating in green supply chain 
initiatives (Lee, 2008)? To what extent, and how will buyer pressure on suppliers to 
engage in CSR issues act as an incentive or disincentive to engage with the CSR agenda 
for SME suppliers (Baden et al. 2009)? Besides suppliers rational interest in 
participation, supplier resources, competencies and awareness have been proposed as 
frictions in the adoption of supplier sustainability practices. Does the supplier have 
enough information, resources, or expertise in order for it to be able to proactively or 
reactively to implement sustainability related requirements?  Is it too busy with day to 
day tasks to be any more than reactive to most issues that are not of immediate urgency 
(Spence, 1999)? Such human, technological, and financial resource or competency 
restrictions of suppliers are especially eminent in SME suppliers (Clark, 2000). SME 
supplier, it has been claimed, have little know-how in bringing into effect the technical 
and managerial changes that would enable them to meet emerging environmental and 
social standards and often hesitate to reach out for help without some external stimulus 
(Luken and Stares, 2005). Further, and as an immediate explanation of why most SME 
suppliers are reactive in adopting social and environmental standards, such supplier 
often simply have less awareness of such requirements (Hall, 2000).  
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Sustainability practices at EAM 
In recent years EAM has experienced an increasing interest from internal and external 
stakeholders on the conditions under which its products are produced. Although a code 
of conduct had be in place since the mitt 1990es if was from 2008 that EAMs focus on 
social and environmental issues internally and externally at suppliers facilities upstream 
in the supply chain accelerated. According to EAM, the main business drivers for the 
work with corporate responsibility were: attracting, retaining and motivating 
employees; attracting social responsible investors (SRI funds); benefiting customer 
relationships; facilitating selection of well-managed suppliers and reducing risks 
associated with partners’ potentially unethical business conduct.  
In 2008, a process was initiated with a view to document and secure that principles 
of corporate responsibility where firmly anchored in the firm and further to facilitate 
that this corporate business philosophy would be more actively reflected in both the 
internal and external communication and practices. As part of the overall company 
project on social and environmental sustainability, it was decided that new and more 
thorough procedures and practices was needed in order to secure a sustainable upstream 
supply chain. This case deals with the part of the overall project that took place within 
the purchasing department. It describes how EAM had developed managerial devices to 
transfer social and environmental standards to their suppliers and how these efforts were 
received by suppliers. Four main outputs from the overall projects were dedicated to 
purchasing. A new code of conduct; a risk assessment tool and procedure; audit site-
visit procedures and guidelines and training material for category managers had to be 
developed and implemented.  
 
Securing contractual compliance 
As a first step in initiating a dialogue and a transfer of requirements and accountability, 
new suppliers receive the document “EAM code of conduct for suppliers”. As the code 
had recently been rewritten it was distributed to existing suppliers. Out of all EAMs  
suppliers about 70% of supplier and 90% of the turnover received the code of conduct 
and were expected to sign it. The remaining 30% of suppliers and 10% of the turnover, 
were either judged to be inactive, or were expected to be phased out inside a short 
timeframe and these suppliers therefore were not involved.  
The code of conduct was a separate five page document. In the document, the aim 
and functioning of the code was explained. Then an overall statement explaining that 
suppliers had to fulfill the international and the entailed standards was provided. Finally, 
and as the core of the document, a list of specific terms detailing supplier expected 
social and environmental behavior was listed and explained (i.e. Conditions of 
Employment and Work; Workplace, Health and Safety; Freedom of Association; Forced 
Labour; Child Labour and Young Workers; Discrimination; Environmental Protection 
and Corruption and Bribery). In order to secure contractual compliance EAM 
distributed the new code of conduct to its existing supplier. Attached to the code was a 
letter that the supplier had to sign: “By signing this letter, we <<Insert company 
name>>, herby confirm that we are in compliance with the EAM Code of Conduct 2009 
and that we accept the terms stated herein”.  
At this stage 98% of the suppliers returned the contract without raising any questions 
or concerns as to its contents, herby officially accepting their accountability of matters 
formulated in the EAM code. Five suppliers however, did comment on specific issue in 
the code. Two could not accept unplanned audits. Two had problems with the contracts 
overtime formulation “Overtime shall be voluntary, infrequent and must not exceed 12 
hours per week”. One of these supplier further commented on the contractual 
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requirements on established working relationships “All workers shall be provided with 
a written, understandable and legally binding labour contract”. In its reply the supplier 
argued and referred to local tradition and local law. This supplier on which EAM was 
highly dependent due to its technological competencies, was EAMs biggest supplier in 
regards to turnover. The supplier signed the code of conduct, although only after 
striking through the two passages in it that could not be accepted. This exception from 
the requirement in the contract was accepted by EAM. In another instance and only 
after a long intense dialogue, a different suppliers requests on not complying with 
requirements on not retaining the passport of some workers, was accepted although only 
reluctantly and conditionally by EAMs purchasing representative “After your latest 
explanation and examining the law once again, I fell sure that what you are doing 
regarding the safe keeping of workers passport is OK and in compliance with our code 
of conduct. But it is “on the boarder” of what we can accept from our suppliers. We 
would like to discuss further during the next visit at yours, but until then we accept the 
below explanation”. Finally, one of EAMs small suppliers could not accept the code 
and refused to sign it, arguing that “we do not have any control over our sub-suppliers”.   
 
Selecting suppliers for audit 
An accounting device named the Corporate Responsibility (CR) risk profile was 
designed to help assess the likelihood that a supplier would not comply with the code of 
conduct. Based on the geographical location of the supplier’s production facilities, the 
industry of the supplier, the supplier’s management systems and the strategic 
importance of the supplier to EAM, a risk score between 0 and 100 was calculated. 
Calculations were done by scoring each of the four dimensions and then multiplying 
these scores with a weight indicating the importance attached to each of the dimensions. 
Based on the total risk score suppliers were then categorized as having high, medium or 
low risk of non-compliance. When asked why the CR risk profile scoring was put in 
place the purchasing manager explained: “The CR-risk profile procedure is put in place 
in order for us to avoid starting up a new supplier relationship, without us knowing the 
risk that they eventually will break our code of conduct”.  
In addition to informing the focal buying company on the potential level of miss-
conduct attached to a particular type of supplier, the initial scoring also instructed 
EAMs category managers whether and when supplier sustainability audits had to be 
performed. For suppliers rated as being in high or medium risk of breach of EAMs code 
of conduct, no new business could be initiated before an on-site sustainability audit with 
satisfactory results has been conducted. Further, suppliers rated in the category high, 
had to be audited every 12 months and suppliers rated in the category medium risk had 
to be audited every 18 months. When, on the other hand, a supplier was rated as being 
in low risk of breach of EAMs code of conduct, a business relationship could be 
commenced right after the code of conduct was signed by the supplier.   
 
Auditing suppliers 
According to the sustainability audit procedure the purpose of the audit was to 
investigate whether the supplier operated in compliance with EAMs Code of Conduct; 
to assess and understand the working practices in the areas covered by the code; to 
identify best practice and potential problem areas and if needed, to agree on an action 
plan for improvement with timeframes and responsibilities. EAM use a neutral third 
party as auditor. An external third party was mainly used due to resource constrains 
internally, but also as a source of special competencies and in some cases as reassurance 
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for suppliers that questioned the objectivity of EAMs auditors and felt reluctant to share 
their documents and show their process technology.  
The audit was structures into a planning phase and an execution phase. In the 
planning phase, the audit team had to determine what question/areas to ask/check during 
the upcoming audit and inform the supplier on timing and scope to ensure that relevant 
documentation and management would be available. In the execution phase, the team 
had to conduct an opening meeting with supplier representatives, request and review 
supplier documents (e.g payslips, overtime documentation ect.), perform an onside 
physical walk through of the facilities, interview at least five different workers and 
inform supplier representatives about initial findings and the schedule for the next audit.  
Both during the planning and execution phase some suppliers acted less cooperative 
than others. Some of these suppliers directly expressed their concern about details in the 
audit procedure. One supplier, when confronted with their non-cooperativeness, argued 
that they felt uneasy about the fact that EAM requested payslips, since these according 
to the supplier would give EAM insights into their cost structure and thus potentially 
could be used in future price negotiations. Also, the fact that EAM as part of their audit 
would document their findings in photos taken on location was objected by this supplier, 
arguing that such documentation could be used to copy their production methods for 
competitive reasons. Finally, the five interviews with workers on location, was 
questioned as a valid device for collecting information. Without the presence of any 
management representatives the supplier felt that workers in these interviews would be 
compelled not to tell the complete truth. According to the suppliers, workers could be 
inclined to worsen stories about their work conditions and in this way mobilise EAM as 
an alley and thereby potentially increase their salaries and work conditions above what 
was required. The supplier therefore requested the presence of the HR-manager during 
the interviews; this however was not accepted by EAM.  
Two managerial devices helped structure the on-location sustainability audit and its 
outcome. The sustainability checklist was developed based on the code of conduct 
formulations and it constrained 124 questions that potentially could be selected for audit. 
5 of these questions were labelled “zero tolerance” and 11 “core convention” these 
questions had to be selected for every audit. If no compliance was found on a zero 
tolerance question, or only 6 core convention question was in compliance, a supplier 
failed the audit. For suppliers rated as being in high risk of breach of EAMs code of 
conduct a more thorough audit had to be performed. An accounting device helped score 
the individual audit questions (areas of compliance) and calculate a total supplier 
sustainability score between 0 and 100 points. For an area in full compliance 2 points 
was awarded, 1 point was awarded for partial compliance and 0 points was awarded for 
non-performance or when adequate compliance documentation could not be accessed. 
Suppliers receiving 90% of the total possible score was categorized as preferable, 
supplier receiving between 70% and 90% were categorized as acceptable and suppliers 
receiving less that 70% failed the sustainability audit. Suppliers failing the audit could 
not without subsequent improvement be accepted as suppliers. 
 
Reacting to supplier audits 
The outcome of the sustainability audit was a compliance audit report. This report was 
produced by the auditing third party and then subsequently sent via EAM to the supplier 
for comments. As part of the compliance audit report template a corrective action plan 
had to be filled out. This plan indicated the non-compliance areas, the level of non-
compliance and the corrective actions advised.  
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Only in rare cases the social and environmental performance of the supplier and the 
willingness of the supplier to change were so far from what could be expected, that 
EAM would give the supplier and ultimatum either to improve conditions or face a 
termination as a supplier. However, also in this instance, the supplier would still receive 
a set of recommendation on how to improve its social and environmental performance. 
In all other cases and right after the audit, EAM and the supplier entered in a dialogue 
on how to resolve the identified non-compliance areas. 
Some of the corrective actions that had to be taken required an initial investment. No 
formalized procedures were in place to guide such investment decisions. In some 
instances, especially when the supplier was important, EAM would be willing to 
involve itself as a resource or pay for such investments. The purchasing manager 
explained “We are willing to participate actively in the corrective actions. We see it as 
our responsibility to secure that our partners or potential partners comply with 
international standards.” In other cases EAM expected the supplier to provide all 
resources and bear the cost of the corrective actions.  
Also for suppliers this phase involved a decision whether willingly to make all the 
changes/investments proposed by EAM and whether to accept to bear full or partial 
costs for them. It seemed that suppliers decisions where guided by a non-formalized 
business case calculation considering questions like: Would the cost involved in the 
investment of the proposed change outweigh the potential benefit from keeping a good 
relation with EAM? Would the proposed change decrease or increase factory floor 
productivity? In one case a supplier only reluctantly and after long considerations 
accepted to involve local Chinese fire department authorities to check if and how the 
firm adequately complied with local legislation, and if and how it could improve 
security for its workers. In an e-mail to EAMs purchasing representative the owner of 
this supplier stated “According to your suggestion last time, we invited the fire and 
safety control team from our government last Thursday. We got a lot of good 
suggestions from them about how to improve safeties in my company. The fire and 
safety control team from the government appreciated that I had invited them since few 
company do that. I feel that they respect us. I feel warm reaction from staffs as well; 
more than 20 staff members are applying to take a position for improving factory 
safety”. When this supplier learned that the involvement of the authorities did not result 
in fines or other types of punishments, but strengthened the firms’ relations with 
government authorities and improved the loyalties of its workers it became more 
inclined to make other proposed changes and investments.  
 
Towards a process model for the transferral of sustainability in the supply chain  
The case illustrates how we can understand the process that connects a buyers attempt to 
transfer its sustainability requirements with its suppliers’ willingness to participate as a 
process comprising four major phases:  securing contractual compliance; selecting 
suppliers for audit; auditing suppliers and reacting to supplier audits. Further, the case 
illustrate how each of these four phases contain in them, either explicit or implicit, a 
range of decision making problems some of which was executed by the buyer and some 
of which was executed by the supplier. Each of these decision, one or more in each 
phase, was further it appears guided by a range of different criteria. The case illustrates 
how the outcome of these decisions will determine the scope and depth with which 
sustainability requirements will be transferred successfully throughout the supply chain. 
We summarise findings in table 1.  
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Table 1: Decision making in the sustainability transferral process  
  Securing contractual 
compliance 
Selecting suppliers for 
audit 
Auditing supplier Reacting to supplier audits
Managerial 
devices used 
Written inscription in 
the form of a code of 
conduct contract 
Accounting device 
(weighted average 
scoring model) 
Audit procedure; 
Checklist and 
Accounting device 
Audit report 
Buyer 
decisions 
A. Who should we send 
it to? 
B. Can we accept 
exceptions from the 
code? 
 
D. Who should we 
include in and exclude 
from our ongoing 
sustainability audit 
procedure?  
E. What activity should 
we involve in the 
audit? 
                                           
G. To what extent can we accept 
what we see? 
H. What corrective actions should 
we suggest? 
I. To what extend should we 
involve ourselves in the 
corrective actions as resource 
and can we accept that we co‐
finance capital investments? 
Buyers 
criteria  
A. Degree to which 
supplier is judged as 
inactive or expected 
to be phased out 
inside a short 
timeframe. 
B. Degree of non‐
compliance and 
buyers dependence 
on the supplier.   
D. Resource 
consumption for 
control; geographical 
location, type of 
industry management 
systems and strategic 
importance of the 
supplier. 
E. Degree to which the
activity is part of the 
checklist and defined 
as “zero tolerance” or 
“core convention”. 
G. Risk of accepting and suppliers 
willingness to improve. 
H. Suppliers’ willingness and ability 
to improve. 
I. Strategic importance of the 
supplier. 
Supplier 
decisions 
C. Can we accept 
terms in the code? 
No supplier 
involvement 
F. How cooperative 
should we be? 
J. Should we willingly make all the 
changes and investments 
proposed by our buyer and 
should we accept to bear the 
full or partial costs for their 
implementation? 
Supplier 
criteria 
C. Local law vs. code of 
conduct and 
dependence of 
supplier on buyer. 
No Supplier 
involvement 
F. Degree to which 
supplier trust the 
buyer not to use audit 
information to act 
opportunistically. 
K. Cost involved relative to 
potential benefit; Experience 
with the strategic and financial 
consequences of previous 
change requests. 
Outcome  
 
Overview of scope and 
depth of supply chain 
contractual 
sustainability 
compliance. 
 
An offsite developed 
sustainability risk map 
of the supply chain. 
Perceived 
confirmation or 
disconfirmation of 
compliance specific to 
individual audited 
suppliers. 
A list of accepted projects going to 
be implemented in order to obtain 
a sustainable supply chain.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on our findings we propose that buyer promoted sustainability in the supply chain 
can be mapped as multiple decision making problems structured in four major phases: 
Securing contractual compliance; Selecting suppliers for audit; Auditing suppliers and 
reacting to supplier audits. We have listed the different decision problems attached to 
these four phases and for each of them proposed decision criteria used by the buyer and 
its suppliers in order to make these decisions. We have demonstrate how different 
accounting devices play a major role in resolving the decision problems and how 
decision criteria apparently unconnected to the sustainability issue affect the outcome of 
the sustainability transferral process in the supply chain.  
We do not claim that our findings can be generalised across cases, however returning 
to the theme of this paper, we have demonstrated how the question of providing 
incentives for suppliers to invest in buyer promoted sustainability activities in the 
supply chain is much more complex than just isolating a few contingency factors. 
Supplier incentives to participate is not occurring at a single point in the sustainability 
transferral process, but instead is spread out and can be assumed to rest on a multitude 
of different decision making problems. Stated differently the case and its analysis 
suggests that suppliers incentive for investment in buyer promoted sustainability 
activities in the supply chain is not an either or, but a matter of degree and timing.  
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Our research have several implication for future research, here we propose three 
issues. First, suggesting our four phase sustainability transferral process as a general 
model, how does other buying firms’ sustainability activity fit into this model? Second, 
do different types of buying firms have different process models? Third, to what extend 
are the decision problems and criteria that we have identified in this study applicable 
across firms and supply chains? 
For practitioners our findings have several implications. It would be valuable for 
buyers to analyse their sustainability enforcing practices as processes comprising 
separate phases. If buyers in each of the separate phases could gain awareness of their 
own and their suppliers’ explicit or implicit decisions as well as the criteria used, such 
buyers, we argue, would increase their ability to control their transferral processes and 
construct positive incentives for supplier to participate in their sustainability initiatives. 
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